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Abstract 
Phased retirement may be defined as a transition path whereby an older employee shifts from full-time to 
part-time work without changing employers. An interesting aspect of phased retirement is that it 
sometimes occurs after the older employee officially “retires”. Then the recently retired employee is 
rehired, and the two events are sometimes separated by less than a week. This chapter makes use of a 
national survey of 950 establishments to address the question of why an employer might make use of 
such an arrangement. We find that most employers might be willing to informally-arranged reductions in 
hours both before and after official retirement, and few impose a formal “waiting-time” between official 
retirement and subsequent rehire. We test several hypotheses about why employers might prefer that 
phased retirement occur before and/or after official retirement. Our results suggest that pensions, 
existing employment arrangements, and organizational size play a role. It is likely that such individually-
negotiated arrangements will become an ever-more important element of the evolving retirement 
paradigm. 
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Chapter 8
Developments in Phased Retirement
Robert Hutchens and Kerry L. Papps
Phased retirement is often seen as a way to encourage older workers to
extend their time in the labor force. The essential idea of phased retire-
ment is that employees then move from full-time work to part-time work
without changing employers. One advantage is that older workers can
reduce hours while maintaining existing skills and job relationships. How-
ever, a curious feature of phased retirement is that it sometimes occurs
after employees have ‘officially’ retired. Even more curious is the fact that
the time interval between official retirement and rehire is sometimes as
short as a day. This seems odd, since there is no ready explanation for why
working hours would be reduced in this way. That is, rehire with reduced
hours might have just as easily occurred before official retirement.
In this chapter, we explore why employers might permit phased retire-
ment only after employees officially retire. We address the question with
the help of interviews conducted with close to 1,000 establishments regard-
ing their phased retirement policies. Employers were asked whether they
would permit an older worker to reduce hours, and, if so, whether they
favored reduction in hours before or after official retirement. Using these
data, we evaluate the extent to which employers actually do favor one or the
other. Interestingly, we find that many employers do not indicate a strong
preference; rather, they seem open to informally arranged reductions in
hours, both before and after official retirement. We also use statistical
methods to analyze what types of employers might permit hour reductions
to occur before and/or after official retirement. Our findings suggest that
the preference for retire/rehire is at the individual rather than the estab-
lishment level, often due to pension and other benefit plan inducements.
We suggest that government policy could enhance work/retirement flexi-
bility by clarifying the meaning of what constitutes retirement under tax
and labor law.
Setting the Stage
Phased retirement appears to have many advantages for both the individual
and the larger society, particularly given labor force aging (see Chapter 7).
Not only might phased retirement provide a more satisfying path to full
retirement, but also it could preserve specific human capital and thereby
enhance productivity. In light of such potential benefits, it is somewhat
disappointing that phased retirement is so rare. Research from the 1980s
reported that fewer than 10 percent or a retiree cohort took phased
retirement; instead, most older workers moved directly from full-time
work to full-time labor force withdrawal (Quinn et al. 1990; Ruhm 1990).
More recent data offer no evidence of a substantive change in the numbers
(Chen 2003).
One plausible explanation for the low incidence of phased retirement is
that employers may restrict opportunities for hours reductions. This sug-
gestion is strengthened by surveys of older workers wherein respondents
indicate a strong interest in phased retirement. For example, over half of
the employed respondents aged 55–65 said they would prefer to gradually
reduce their hours of work as they age according to the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS; USGAO 2001). Similarly, Abraham and House-
man (Chapter 5) report that among older workers having retirement plans,
many plan to cut back on work hours, instead of fully retiring. Hence it
would appear that the low incidence of phased retirement may not be due
to lack of worker interest.
There is an interesting contrast between the USA and Japan in this regard.
Large Japanese employers often provide work opportunities for some frac-
tion of their employees who reach the organization’s mandatory retirement
age (Rebick 1995). Typically, these post-career jobs involve reduced hours
with the current employer or an affiliate of the current employer, so they are
very similar to phased retirement. A striking feature of these post-career
jobs is that while many employees indicate an interest in them,1 employers
are often quite selective about which workers have the opportunity to take
them. Accordingly, high-performing employees are more likely to gain
access to the jobs in Japan. In this sense, if we could show that US employers
are targeting phased retirement opportunities to specific types of workers,
they are not unique; in this they are similar to Japanese practice.
If US employers do limit opportunities for phased retirement, the ques-
tion arises as to why. One explanation, advanced by Gustman and Stein-
meier (1983), hypothesized that these limits might be more prevalent
where firms impose minimum working hours constraints. This occurs
when employees are required to work a minimum number of hours per
week, month and/or year. Various explanations might rationalize such
minimum hours constraints, including a production process that requires
the presence of a team of workers; in any event, the point is that employees
in these jobs can only reduce hours by quitting and taking a different job.
In this case phased retirement (or, for that matter, part-time work at any
age) would simply not be feasible.
An important alternative hypothesis for reluctance to offer phased re-
tirement focuses on the role of defined benefit (DB) pension plans. As a
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rule, these pensions base benefits on a formula which rewards pay and
service; as such they are distinct from defined contribution (DC) pensions
where benefits are tied to the amount of money in an individual account at
the time of retirement. Several analysts suggest that workers with DB
pensions face formidable obstacles to phased retirement, as compared to
those with DC pensions or no pension at all (Quinn et al. 1990; Hurd 1996;
US GAO 2001).
DB pension plans may constrain phased retirement for several reasons.
First, DB plans sometimes base pension benefits on earnings during the
final few years before retirement. In this event, work at half-time or at
partial-pay before retirement would potentially reduce all future pension
benefits substantially, which in turn will discourage part-time work. The
same issue does not arise as sharply in a DC plan, since the benefit formula
is linked to the individual’s account. Hence working half-time before
retirement will not generate a similar loss in future pension benefits.2
A second concern is that Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax regulations
make it difficult for employees to combine salary income with pension
benefits from the current employer’s DB plan. Specifically, an active em-
ployee cannot receive DB benefits before the plan’s normal retirement age
(Purcell 2004). By implication, a worker who took phased retirement
before a DB plan’s normal retirement age (and thus stayed with the current
employer) might not be able to supplement earnings with payments from
that plan. This is less of a concern for a DC plan inasmuch as the IRS
permits active employees to draw DC pension benefits, with the only major
federal limitation requiring that the employee be over age 591⁄2 .
3
Our own previous work has also investigated the extent to which pen-
sions and minimum hours constraints might influence phased retirement
opportunities (Hutchens 2003; Hutchens and Chen 2004; Hutchens and
Grace-Martin 2004). This research relies on an employer survey, to be
described in more detail below; in short, we ask a sample of close to 1,000
employers about their views on phased retirement and what conditions
might have to be in place to permit it. Several interesting results flowed
from that research. One finding was that, generally, employers appear to
prefer informal over formal arrangements. This is because many employers
want to maintain control over which employees are offered the opportunity
for phased retirement, the type of job they do as a part-timer, and when the
work is performed (e.g. not during a period of diminished demand). In
other words, employers are selective about who gets an opportunity for
phased retirement (Hutchens and Chen 2004). We have also, in our earlier
research, evaluated the effects of minimum hours constraints and pen-
sions, and while we find support for the minimum hours constraints,
there is virtually no support for the pension hypothesis (Hutchens and
Grace-Martin 2004). In particular, employers with DB plans offer oppor-
tunities for phased retirement at roughly the same rate as do employers
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with DC plans. We also found that business conditions matter, a result that
agrees with a Watson Wyatt (1999) survey where respondents indicated that
‘hiring retirees for part-time and temporary work’ is the most common
phased retirement arrangement.
Our analysis further revealed that industries differ according to the
opportunities for phased retirement: these were higher in the service sector
and lower in public administration (excluding health, education, and social
services). In addition, smaller organizations were more likely to permit
phased retirement. And finally, if a large percentage of the white-collar
workforce was unionized, establishments were less likely to permit phased
retirement. These last two results were surprising since neither organization
size nor unions were suggested as important factors in the previous litera-
ture. Nevertheless, we find that unions tend to prefer the codification of a
contract, and large bureaucracies favor the consistency imposed by formal
personnel policies. These preferences for codified and consistent policies
and practices may then limit opportunities for phased retirement.
Why Hours Reductions Might Occur after Official
Retirement
At first blush, there might seem to be no reason for employers to prefer
workers to reduce their hour of work after, rather than before, ‘official’
retirement. Either way, the same employee works the same hours, and
there is no obvious reason to favor one over the other if the only difference
is that one precedes the retirement party while the other does not. On the
other hand, phased retirement is an uncommon event, and there might be
costs of setting up the formal structure. Accordingly, if employers minimize
costs when accommodating a request for phased retirement, it would likely
be easier if there are already temporary or contract workers in the estab-
lishment. Similarly, if an employer has policies involving flexible hours
(e.g. the firm permits job-sharing or flexible starting times), then that
employer should be more likely to permit phased retirement before official
retirement because it is already a mechanism for accommodating nonstan-
dard schedules. Accordingly we propose:
Hypothesis 1. Regarding existing employment arrangements: Other things
equal, employers who permit flexible hours and job sharing are more likely
to permit phased retirement before official retirement. Employers who use
temporary, contract, or contingent workers are more likely to permit
phased retirement after official retirement.
As noted above, it may also be true that the form and shape of the
employer’s pension offerings will influence whether phased retirement
occurs before or after official retirement. One version of this argument
focuses on the fact that some DB pensions base a retiree’s pension benefits
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on earnings during the final few years before retirement, so such a pension
would impose a major benefit penalty on the employee who shifted to part-
time work. As Hurd (1996: 7) notes, ‘a common way to avoid this problem is
to have the worker retire, fixing the benefit, and then be rehired as a
consultant or outside employee who has no benefits, and particularly no
accrual of pension.’
In addition, the complex IRS regulations may make it difficult for active
employees to receive benefits from their current employer’s DB pension
plan if they are younger than the plan’s normal retirement age. In particu-
lar, the law is unclear about what constitutes a bona fide termination of
employment, as noted by Penner et al. (2002: 82):
In many cases, employers, particularly small employers, are unaware of this tech-
nical requirement. Others take advantage of the absence of clear guidelines and
bestow retiree status liberally. There is little risk of detection and even less risk of
enforcement. Few employees would sue as the arrangement only benefits them, and
federal regulators would become aware of the issue only through a detailed plan
audit, if even then. On the other hand, the penalty for being caught—possible plan
disqualification and loss of tax benefits for all plan participants—is severe.
Similar legal complications do not arise with DC plans. As long as the
employee is over age 591⁄2 , Federal law does not prohibit using benefits
from a DC plan to supplement salary either before or after official retire-
ment. It follows that establishments with only a DC plan would be expected
to permit phased retirement both before and after official retirement.
Accordingly we propose:
Hypothesis 2. Regarding pensions: Other things equal, employers with only
a DB plan will tend to provide opportunities for phased retirement after
official retirement. Employers with only a DC plan will tend to provide
opportunities for phased retirement both before and after official retire-
ment.4
The Survey and the Key Questions
To test these hypotheses empirically, we analyze a survey of 950 establish-
ments with 20þ more employees.5 An establishment is defined as a single
physical location at which business is conducted or services or industrial
operations are performed; it may or may not be part of a larger organiza-
tion (e.g. General Motors has hundreds of establishments). The survey
focused on white-collar workers, and the sample was restricted to nonagri-
cultural establishments with twenty or more employees and at least two
white-collar employees who are aged 55þ.6 This latter restriction ensures
that questions about phased retirement are relevant to the establishment’s
current situation. The focus on white-collar workers is due to the need to
conduct reasonably brief interviews.
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The telephone survey was undertaken between June 2001 and November
2002 by the University of Massachusetts Center for Survey Research. The
Center first contacted the establishment and asked for the person who was
best able to answer questions about flexible work schedules and employee
benefits (e.g. a human resource manager or benefits manager). In larger
establishments, especially those that were part of a complex organization, it
was sometimes necessary to rely on multiple respondents.7 Our overall
response rate was 61 percent, with most nonresponse arising when screen-
ing establishments for eligibility (e.g. all had to have at least two white-
collar employees age 55þ); selection thus occurred before respondents
knew the purpose of the survey. Interviews were completed for 89 percent
of the establishments that were successfully screened, a rate comparable to
other establishment-level telephone surveys.8
After asking a series of question about the characteristics of the estab-
lishment and its human resource and pension policies, the interviewer
posed the following question:
Question 1. Think of a secure full-time white-collar employee who is aged 55 or
over. One day that person comes to you and says that at some point in the next few
years he/she may want to shift to a part-time work schedule at this establishment.
Could this person’s request to shift to part-time employment be worked out in a way
that would be acceptable to your establishment?
If the response was ‘yes’ or ‘in some cases,’ then additional questions were
asked about how this could be worked out. For example, the respondent
was asked to explain what he or she meant by part-time: part-week, part-
year, or something else.9 There was also a question about the preferred
timing of the phased retirement. Specifically:
Question 2. If the employee did shift from a full-time to a part-time work schedule,
could he/she shift to part-time work before official retirement, would he/she have to
officially retire first, or could he/she do either ?
Results from both questions are tabulated in Table 8-1,10 and they indicate
that almost 70 percent of the establishments were willing to permit phased
retirement, while a further 15 percent allowed it in some cases.11 Only 14
percent of establishments would not permit phased retirement at all. Of
the 779 establishments that said ‘yes’ or ‘in some cases’ to Q1, the great
majority indicated that the reduction in hours could take place either
before or after official retirement. Only 15 percent reported that full-time
employees could only move to a part-time schedule before retirement, and
7 percent said that part-time was only possible after official retirement. The
fact that so many establishments can accommodate phased retirement
either before or after official retirement suggests that establishment char-
acteristics may be less important than individual characteristics in influen-
cing the timing of phased retirement.12
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One issue we seek to evaluate is whether employers who claim that they
would permit phased retirement actually do so in practice. Accordingly, the
survey included a question about whether, in the last three years, a white-
collar worker age 55þhad actually shifted from a full-time to a part-time work
schedule. For those employers who said that something could be worked out
before official retirement, fully 36 percent said ‘yes,’ someone had made that
shift before official retirement. For those who indicated that something
could be worked out after official retirement, 22 percent said ‘yes,’ it had
happened in the last three years. As one would expect, these percentages
increase with size of establishment.13 Thus, when these employers claim that
something can be worked out, there is reason to believe them.
If a respondent indicated that hours could be reduced after official retire-
ment, the interviewer then sought to learn more about how this would be
implemented. One question dealt with the nature of the employment rela-
tionship. As indicated in Figure 8-1, employers favor hiring white-collar
retirees as part-time workers for a specific project or a specific length of
time. Interestingly, however, the second most-favored option is to place the
older employee into a regular part-time position; least favored is independ-
ent contractor. Only 22 percent of the establishments report that it is not at
all likely that the person would be hired as an independent contractor.
Figure 8-2 examines the waiting period between official retirement and
return to work. Most employers do not require a waiting period, and
among those that do, the majority require fewer than two months.
Even among employers with DB plans, the majority reported no waiting
period. Workers can and do retire on Friday and return to the same
employer as a part-timer on Monday. Finally, Figure 8-3 examines the
form of part-time work that employers prefer for rehired retirees. There
is a preference for part-week over part-year or part-day. Still, there is a
significant degree of flexibility here. At some establishments one can
work out either a part-year or part-week arrangement.
Table 8-1 Responses to Questions about Availability and Timing of Phased
Retirement
Whether phased
retirement is available
When phased retirement may occur in relation to official retirement
Before After Either Not specified Total
Yes 119 48 435 39 641
In some cases 25 15 81 17 138
No — — — — 131
Not specified — — — — 40
Total 144 63 516 56 950
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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To gain a better understanding of the results, Table 8-2 tabulates charac-
teristics of employers who responded in different ways to Q2. Establishments
in column 1 only allow phased retirement before official retirement, those in
the third column only allow phased retirement after official retirement, and
those in column 5 permit either type of phased retirement. For example, the
first entry in column 1 indicates that of those establishments that only
allowed phased retirement before official retirement, three percent were in
the construction industry. Similarly, the first entry in column 3 indicates that
of those establishments that only allowed phased retirement after official
retirement, one percent was in the construction industry. By implication,
the industry percentages in column 1 sum to 100 percent as do the industry
Part-week
57%
Part-year
5%
Part-week or
part-year
32%
Other
2%Part-day
3%
Part-week or
part-day
1%
Figure 8-1. Nature of the employment relationship in establishments that rehire
retirees as part-time workers.
Source : Authors’ calculations.
0 months
81%
2−4 months
2%
4−6 months
3%
12+ months
1%
10−12 months
3%
0−2 months
10%
Figure 8-2. Minimum time between retire and rehire: establishments that rehire
retirees as part-time workers.
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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percentages in columns 3 and 5. Looking at the remaining industries, we see
that industrial composition is quite similar across the three columns. The
major exception is the service sector. In health, education, and social ser-
vices, phased retirement is more likely to only be permitted before official
retirement. The opposite is true in other services, where establishments tend
to prefer what we shall term ‘retire-rehire’. The asterisk next to the column 1
entry indicates that for both of these service industries, the difference
between the averages in columns 1 and 3 is statistically significant at a 5
percent level. Table 8-2 also reveals an interesting regional pattern. Estab-
lishments in the South tend to be particularly likely to offer retire/rehire,
while those in the West lean toward reduced hours before official retire-
ment. Such results make one wonder whether this phenomenon is more a
matter of taste than economic fundamentals.
The results on establishment and organization size strongly suggest that
the phenomenon is not simply a matter of taste. The size composition of
the establishments in columns 1 and 3 are similar (none of the differences
are statistically significant at a 5 percent level), but results in column 5
reveal that small establishments are more likely to say that phased retire-
ment is allowed, both before and after phased retirement. As establishment
size increases, employers move away from this ‘anything goes’ response.
0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Rehired as an
independent
contractor
Rehired for a
specific project
or duration
Rehired into
regular part-
time position
Very likely
Somewhat
Not at all
Figure 8-3. Possible employment arrangements for rehired retirees.
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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Perhaps bureaucracy plays a role in the results: that is, effective functioning
of large establishments may require formal rules and procedures, whereas
small establishments may have more flexible policies and thereby be more
likely to permit hour reductions either before or after official retirement.
This idea gains support from the data on organization size. Organization
size differs from establishment size because, as noted above, an establish-
ment may belong to larger organizations, for example, a school building
may belong to a larger school district. Fully 61 percent of the column 3
establishments are part of a larger organization, while only 28 percent of
the column 5 establishments belong to a larger organization. As indicated
by the dagger (y) to the right of the 0.28 entries, this column 5 average is
statistically different from both the column 1 and column 3 average. Thus,
establishments that are part of a larger organization are less likely to say
‘anything goes.’ Such evidence is certainly consistent with the idea that
bureaucracy plays a role in these results; establishments that are part of
larger organizations are presumably more likely to have formal rules and
procedures governing the path into retirement.
Part E of Table 8-2 examines pensions. Since pensions have been thought
to be a key determinant of employer phased retirement policy, considerable
effort was devoted to obtain accurate pension information. Respondents
were asked whether older white-collar workers were covered by a traditional
DB plan, a cash balance plan, a DC plan, or something else. In addition,
respondents were given a list of possible pension types (401 (K), ESOP,
etc.). We used this information to assess whether the establishment had a
DB or DC pension. For example, if the respondent told us that the pension
was a cash balance plan, then regardless of what the respondent said about
the type of plan, the pension was classified as a DB pension. Since many
firms have multiple plans (e.g. a traditional DB as well as a 401 (K)), the
interviewers also sought information on each of the plans. Some respond-
ents were able to provide detailed answers; others had difficulty remember-
ing their establishment’s pension but we pursued these where possible.14
From the second hypothesis, we expect retire rehire to be more likely in
establishments with DB plans. In fact, columns 1 and 3 are quite similar.
While 34 percent of the ‘after’ establishments in column 3 had a DB plan
and no DC plan, 32 percent of the ‘before’ establishments had this ar-
rangement. In contrast, a significant difference appears in column 5 where
only 20 percent of the ‘before or after’ establishments were classified as
having only a DB plan. A mirror image of this result is found for establish-
ments that only had a DC plan; once again the column 1 and column 3
results are roughly similar while a significantly larger 51 percent of the
column 5 ‘before and after’ establishments have only a DC plan. Thus, DC
plans are evidently associated with greater flexibility in the timing of
phased retirement. Of course, this could be related to the results on
establishment and organization size. DC plans are often found in
small establishments and organizations.
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Part F of Table 8-2 examines selected characteristics of the establish-
ment’s workforce. The percentage of all employees who are white-collar is
roughly the same across the three columns as is the percentage of white-
collar workers who are part-time. That is not, however, the case for the
percentage of white-collar workers who are covered by a collective bargain-
ing agreement. For the ‘before’ establishments in column 1, an average of
23 percent of the white-collar workers were covered by a collective bargain-
ing agreement. This number is almost the same (25 percent) for the
column 3 ‘after’ establishments.15 It is, however, only 12 percent for the
‘before or after’ establishments in column 5. This is, of course, quite similar
to the results for DB pensions; it may simply reflect the fact that unions
often negotiate DB pensions.
It is reasonable to expect flexibility in the timing of phased retirement to
be associated with flexibility in the timing of when people come to work.
Both types of flexibility imply an openness to alternative work schedules.
Part G of Table 8-2 examines selected human resource policies of the
establishment, where the data show that establishments where white-collar
workers have flexible starting times are particularly likely to indicate that
phased retirement can occur either before or after official retirement
(column 5). Further, they are much less likely to indicate that phased
retirement can only occur after official retirement. One might similarly
expect establishments that permit job sharing to be flexible in the timing of
phased retirement. In fact, although the results on job sharing exhibit the
same basic pattern as those for flexible starting times, the differences in
column averages are not statistically significant. Finally, the survey asked
whether in the last 12 months, the establishment has used temporary,
contract, or contingent workers in white-collar positions. In line with the
first hypothesis, it is reasonable to expect such establishments to be more
open to retire-rehire. In such cases the employee can essentially return to
the establishment as a temporary worker. While the Table 8-2 data are
consistent with this, once again the differences in column averages are
not statistically significant.
To evaluate whether these univariate results are robust to controls for
other variables, we also estimated three Probit models with different depen-
dent variables.16 Specifically, we examine whether the employer only allows
phased retirement before official retirement; whether the employer
allows phased retirement both before and after official retirement; and
whether the employer only allows phased retirement after official retire-
ment.17 Our goal is to understand why some employers prefer that phased
retirement occur before or after official retirement, so we focus on estab-
lishments that answered ‘yes’ or ‘in some cases’ to Q1.18
Rather than focusing on specific results, here we summarize findings and
provide detailed estimates in the Appendix for interested readers. One
interesting finding pertains to whether the establishment is part of a larger
organization; other things equal, the probability that an establishment only
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allows phased retirement before (after) official retirement is particularly
high when the establishment is part of an organization with more than
1,000 (fewer than 1,000) employees. If an establishment is not part of a
larger organization, then it is more likely to respond that phased retire-
ment can occur either before or after official retirement. Another finding is
that the economic and organizational environment within which the estab-
lishment operates are relatively unimportant; indeed most are not statistic-
ally significant at conventional significance levels.
Table 8-3 presents simulated probabilities for key variables assuming a
base case where the establishment is not part of a larger organization and all
other explanatory variables are set at the sample means. In this case, the
probability that the establishment requires that phased retirement occur
before official retirement is 15.5 percent, requires that phased retirement
occur after is 5.1 percent, and permits both before and after is 76 percent.19
Now suppose this establishment were integrated into a larger organiza-
tion with fewer than 1,000 employees. According to Table 8-4, this change
would increase the ‘before’ probability from 15.5 to 16.6 percent, the
‘after’ probability from 5.1 to 13.8 percent, and decrease the ‘either’
probability from 76 to 63.2 percent. In essence the establishment moves
away from an ‘anything goes’ attitude toward rules governing the timing of
phased retirement. If the organization had more than 1,000 employees,
then the increase in the ‘before’ probability would be even greater. This
supports the view that very large organizations tend to be bureaucratic with
employment regulated through a set of formal rules. Not only do such
organizations avoid phased retirement (Hutchens and Grace-Martin 2004),
but also the procedural requirements that surround hiring of new workers
may lead them to avoid rehiring retired workers.
We also explore variables that represent minimum hours constraints. We
expect establishments with flexible starting times and job sharing to be
Table 8-3 Simulated Effects of Organization Size from Probit Models
Probability of phased retirement
Only before
official
retirement
Before and
after official
retirement
Only after
official
retirement
Establishment is not part
of a larger organization
0.155 0.760 0.051
Establishment is part of a larger
organization:
With fewer than 1,000 employees 0.166 0.632 0.138
With 1,000 or more employees 0.247 0.674 0.052
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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more open to hours reductions before official retirement, and establish-
ments that use temporary workers to favor retire-rehire outcomes. How-
ever, our estimated models suggest a somewhat different relationship: thus
we find that establishments with flexible starting times are more likely to
offer phased retirement either before or after official retirement. Further,
after controlling for other variables, there is a nonlinear relationship
between the percentage of employees working part-time and the timing
of phased retirement. In other words, establishments with only a few or no
part-time workers tend to favor hour reductions before official retirement,
but as the percentage of part-time workers rises, the establishment tends to
become more open to hours reductions either before or after official
retirement. Table 8-4 depicts this relationship, using the same simulation
approach employed in Table 8-3.20 This unanticipated finding may be
explained by the view that establishments with few part-time workers are
willing to have retirees return to work but not as part-timers. Since most
work schedules in the establishment are full-time, a retiree who wants to
return will have to work a full-time schedule. If such an establishment were
to accommodate an hour reduction by an older worker, then it will either
do so before official retirement or not at all.
We also explore the type of pension offered by establishments and link it
to key outcomes of interest. As we expected, establishments with DB benefit
pensions (regardless of whether they have a DC pension) were more likely
to offer opportunities for reduced hours after official retirement. This
result is only statistically significant for establishments that combine DB
and DC plans. Table 8-5 illustrates the magnitudes using methods similar to
Tables 8-3 and 8-4. The majority of establishments with only DC plans allow
phased retirement both before and after retirement, and those establish-
ments with DB plans are more likely to offer phased retirement only after
Table 8-4 Simulated Effects of Part-Time Percentage from Probit Models
Probability of phased retirement
Only before
official retirement
Before and after
official retirement
Only after
official retirement
Percentage of White Collar
that Work Part Time:
0 percent 0.224 0.680 0.061
10 percent 0.148 0.754 0.064
20 percent 0.106 0.803 0.061
30 percent 0.086 0.833 0.052
40 percent 0.080 0.848 0.039
50 percent 0.088 0.850 0.026
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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retirement. Curiously, these establishments are also more likely to require
that hour reductions occur before official retirement; this effect is not
statistically significant but it is interesting. In an establishment with a DB
plan, workers can reduce hours before they officially retire if (a) they
supplement salary with pension benefits and are older than the DB plan’s
normal retirement age, or (b) they do not supplement salary with pension
benefits. Perhaps these establishments with DB plans are avoiding the legal
conundrum of deciding what constitutes a bona fide retirement. In effect,
one either takes phased retirement before official retirement or not at all.
And if salary is to be supplemented with pension benefits, then the worker
simply must have reached the normal retirement age in the pension. While
this simple rule avoids the above noted legal issues associated with paying
pensions to rehired retirees, it probably also has the effect of discouraging
phased retirement.
In summary, our key empirical finding is that many employers are open to
hours reductions both before and after official retirement. This ‘anything
goes’ position is particularly likely in establishments that are not part of a
large organization, do not have unions, and have DC pensions. Of course,
we suspect that that does not really mean ‘anything goes;’ rather, employers
may have clear preferences when it comes to phased retirement options for
specific workers. By this argument, employer preferences about the timing
of phased retirement pertain to a specific individual doing a specific job.
What matters less is the establishment characteristics and what matters
more, the characteristic of the individual worker, the pension, and the job.
Our two hypotheses provide a partial explanation for what is going on in
the multivariate analysis. Both pensions and existing employment arrange-
ments influence the timing of hour reductions relative to official retire-
ment, but not in precisely the way anticipated by the hypotheses. Moreover,
we found that establishments with few part-timers and that are part of large
organizations tend to prefer that phased retirement occur before official
retirement.
Table 8-5 Simulated Effects of Pensions from Probit Models
Probability of phased retirement
Only before
official retirement
Before and after
official retirement
Only after
official retirement
Defined contribution only 0.165 0.761 0.044
Defined benefit only 0.193 0.720 0.051
Both DB and DC 0.202 0.615 0.138
Cannot classify pension 0.166 0.821 0.010
No pension 0.155 0.700 0.113
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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Conclusions
This chapter asks why firms might only permit phased retirement after its
workers officially retire. Our answer proves complicated. First, those em-
ployers who permit some form of phased retirement do not usually restrict
it to rehiring of retirees. In fact, most employers say they are open to
informally-arranged hours reductions both before and after official retire-
ment. Second, we were surprised to find that neither univariate nor multi-
variate statistical methods provide strong support for the claim that either
pensions or existing employment arrangements drive an establishment
level preference for retire-rehire. Also surprising was the result on organ-
ization size; all indications are that if an organization with more than 1000
employees permits some form of phased retirement, then it will tend to not
prefer retire/rehire.
These results, along with the fact that employers favor informal arrange-
ments, lead us to suspect that the real preference for retire/rehire is at the
individual rather than the establishment level. In many establishments,
both pensions and existing employment arrangements differ across jobs.
Some workers are covered by DB plans while others are not. Some workers
are in jobs that employ temporary and contingent workers, while others are
not. For this reason, it might not make sense to have an establishment-wide
preference for retire/rehire. Rather, employers and employees may be
interested in reducing hours in ways that meet their job and worker-specific
needs. This could mean reduced hours before official retirement for one
worker, but after official retirement for another.
It is likely that such individually negotiated arrangements will become
an ever-more important element of the evolving retirement paradigm.
Like Japanese employers, Western employers often want to be selective
about which older workers have an opportunity for continued work at
reduced hours. This selectivity has the advantage of producing employment
relationships beneficial to both employers and employees. It might also have
the disadvantage of perceived inequity; thus a given employer might grant
apparently similar workers very different opportunities for continued work.
Government policy might enhance this labor market flexibility by clarify-
ing the meaning of a bona fide retirement. As noted above, it is legal for
workers to retire, begin receiving DB pension benefits, and then be rehired
by their former employer as long as he had reached the plan’s normal
retirement age. Further, even if he were younger than this age, the transition
would be legal so long as the worker’s retirement was bona fide. Unfortu-
nately the IRS provides no clear definition of what constitutes a bona fide
retirement, and employers might fear penalties for an incorrect interpret-
ation of the regulations. Clarifying these rules could reduce uncertainty and
thereby facilitate efficient transactions, a result of potentially large import-
ance for large organizations likely to be targets of government scrutiny.
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Endnotes
1. See http://www.asahi.com/english/business/TKY200406100152.html We thank Oli-
via Mitchell for pointing out this article.
2. This is not to say there will be no effect; the half-time worker usually contributes
less to the account and thereby accrues a smaller pension asset than an equiva-
lent full-time worker.
3. This is the essence of the key regulations, but they are quire complex. For
example, in one type of DC plan (a money purchase plan) benefits are treated
just as are traditional DB benefits. For a more complete treatment see Fields
and Hutchens (2002) and Penner et al. (2002).
4. Hypotheses 1 and 2 are formulated at the establishment level, but they could
just as easily apply to the individual. For example, if temporary and contract
workers take on tasks similar to those of a current employee, then phased
retirement by that employee may more easily be accommodated after official
retirement. Similarly, different workers in the same establishment can have
different types of pension coverage; some may be covered by a 401(k) plan,
others by a traditional DB pension, and still others by both plans. In such a
situation, the employer might prefer that some workers move to part-time
before official retirement, while other workers make a similar shift after official
retirement.
5. The sample universe was the Dun and Bradstreet Strategic Marketing Record
for December 2000. These data primarily come from credit checks, although
information is also obtained from the United States Postal Service, banks,
newspapers, yellow pages and other public records. In order to ensure adequate
numbers of large establishments, the sample was stratified by establishment
size; most of the results are weighted to ensure representative samples.
6. The 1999 Census Bureau County Business Patterns indicates that, excluding
government, railroads and the self-employed, approximately 15 percent of all
establishments have 20 or more employees and 75 percent of all employees
work in establishments with 20 or more employees.
7. Interviews were conducted with a Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing
(CATI) system, thereby permitting an interview to be completed over several
telephone calls. The median number of telephone calls required to complete an
interview was 10, with 10 percent of the interviews requiring 30 or more calls to
complete.
8. The response rate was 64 percent in the Educational Quality of the Workforce
National Employers Survey administered by the United States Bureau of the
Census as a telephone survey in August and September 1994 to a nationally
representative sample of private establishments with more than 20 employees
(see Lynch and Black 1998). The response rate was 65.5 percent in Osterman’s
(1992) telephone survey of establishments with more than 50 employees (see
Osterman (1994). Holzer and Neumark (1999) reported a response rate of 67
percent for establishments that were successfully screened in a telephone survey
undertaken between June 1992 and May 1994.
9. If the respondent said that part-time could not be worked out, the survey made
certain by asking whether part-year might be possible.
10. Application of weights has virtually no effect on these numbers.
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11. These numbers differ from those in Hutchens (2003) because Table 8-1 in-
cludes respondents in the ‘not specified’ category.
12. Our results indicate more availability of phased retirement than the Watson
Wyatt (1999) study. We have no ready explanation for the difference, though
the two surveys undoubtedly ask different questions and the samples are surely
distinct (our sample appears to have more smaller organizations). The Ameri-
can Association of Retired Persons (AARP) (2000) also suggests that their
response rate may have been low.
13. Small establishments may employ only a handful of people over 55, so if no one
was interested in phased retirement, the right answer to the question would be
‘no’ regardless of the opportunity. This is less likely in large establishments with
more workers age 55þ. In fact, for establishments with 500 or more employees,
the comparable percentages are 67 percent of the ‘before’ employers and 71
percent of the ‘after’ employers.
14. For example, one respondent told us that the pension was the Arkansas teacher
retirement plan. In that case we checked with Arkansas to find out whether the
plan was a DB or DC plan.
15. Health insurance may also play a role. Therefore employers who required that
phased retirement occur after official retirement were, in contrast to those who
required that it occur before official retirement, particularly likely to provide
retiree health insurance and particularly unlikely to provide health insurance
to part-timers. These differences were not statistically significant but the pattern
suggests that employers who practice retire-rehire tend to provide health insur-
ance in a way that reinforces the practice.
16. Results using an ordered Probit model indicated that the data did not follow
the hierarchical structure imposing by the ordering so we rely on the simple
Probits here.
17. As is the case with any survey, some respondents did not answer all of the
questions. In our multivariate work we use listwise deletion of observations
with missing data. As a result, the analysis is based on 552 rather than 723
observations. See Allison (2002) for a discussion of the advantages of listwise
deletion. Hutchens and Grace-Martin (2004) uses multiple imputation to ad-
dress missing data issues in this survey. Those results indicated that missing data
does not seriously bias coefficients.
18. In statistical terms, this can be viewed as a problem involving a marginal and
conditional probability. Thus, Pr(Y2i ¼ k) ¼ Pr(Y2i ¼ kjY1i ¼ 1)Pr(Y1i ¼ 1),
where Pr(Y2i ¼ k) is the probability that Y2i equals k with k ¼ 0,1,2 (the three
answers to Q2) for establishment i; Pr(Y2i ¼ kjY1i ¼ 1) is the probability that Y2i
equals k conditional on Y1i equals 1 (the ‘conditional probability’), and
Pr(Y1i ¼ 1) is the probability that Y1i equals 1 (the ‘marginal probability’),
where Y1i equals 1 when the answer to Q1 is ‘yes’ or ‘in some cases.’ This
paper estimates the conditional probability, while Hutchens and Grace-Martin
(2004) estimate the marginal probability.
19. For purposes of this illustration, probabilities are predicted with the ‘before’
and ‘either’ Probit, and the ‘after’ probability calculated as a residual. Compu-
tations were done this way because the ‘before’ and ‘either’ categories have
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larger sample sizes. If we use the ‘after’ Probit for predictions, qualitative results
are similar.
20. The table stops at 50 percent part-time because very few establishments in the
sample exceed that percentage.
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